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Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 61 (September 22, 2005)1 
 
FAMILY LAW – ATTORNEY FEES 
 
Summary 
 The Nevada Supreme Court upheld district court ruling that awarded Wilfong’s counsel, 
serving pro bono, $3,000 in attorney fees.  The court also held that NRS 126.171 authorizes 
attorney fees in paternity actions. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Wilfong and Miller were involved in an intimate relationship which produced a child.  
Miller filed a petition to determine paternity and sought joint physical custody of the child.  Pro 
bono counsel represented Wilfong.  The district court awarded Wilfong primary physical 
custody, child support, and $3,000 in attorney fees.  The district court based the award of 
attorney fees on Sargeant v. Sargeant.2  Miller appealed the award of attorney fees. 
 
Discussion 
 The court stated when a district court may properly award attorney fees.  First, attorney 
fees must be authorized by express or implied agreement or by statute or rule.3  When attorney 
fees are authorized, the trial court must evaluate factors such as qualities of the advocate, 
character and difficulty of the work performed, and the result obtained; as set forth in Brunzell v. 
Golden Gate National Bank.4  Also, in family law cases, the trial court must consider the 
disparity in income of the parties under Wright v. Osburn.5  
The court found significant public policy rationales to support awarding fees to pro bono 
counsel.  First, responsible parties should not be absolved of their financial obligations because 
the other party is represented by pro bono legal assistance.  Also, in domestic matters, one 
partner has often created the other partner’s limited financial means by leaving the household, 
failing to remit child support, drawing funds from a shared account, or other similar conduct.  In 
those cases, if fees are not awarded, the wealthier partner is benefiting from creating conditions 
that force the other party to seek pro bono assistance. 
Here, the district court granted attorney fees under Sargeant v. Sargeant.6  The court 
determined Sargeant is limited to divorce proceedings and therefore was not an appropriate basis 
on which to award fees.  Moreover, the financial hardship concern in Sargeant is not present in 
this case because Wilfong was represented by pro bono counsel.   
The court found that attorney fees are authorized in this case under NRS 126.171 which 
provides that “[in paternity actions,] the court may order reasonable fees of counsel . . . to be 
paid by the parties in proportions and at times determined by the court.”   
                                                          
1 By Jason Peck 
2 88 Nev. 223, 495 P.2d 618 (1972). 
3 Schouweiler v. Yancey Co., 101 Nev. 827, 830, 712 P.2d 786, 788 (1985). 
4 85 Nev. 345, 455 P.2d 31 (1969). 
5 114 Nev. 1367, 970 P.2d 1071 (1998). 
6 Sargeant involved a divorce action where the court found an award of $50,000 proper because the wife, although 
she had the resources to pay the amount, would have been required to liquidate her savings and jeopardize her 
financial future in order to meet her adversary in court on an equal basis.  88 Nev. 223, 495 P.2d 618. 
The court found that the record revealed that Wilfong’s counsel was an able advocate, the 
work was difficult, the result favorable to Wilfong and that counsel provided the equivalent of 
$27,000 in time representing Wilfong, thus satisfying the Brunzell factors.  The district court 
found that there was a disparity in income, which satisfied Wright.  Thus the award of attorney 
fees was proper. 
 
Conclusion 
 An award of attorney fees to pro bono counsel is appropriate provided that a legal basis 
exists and the proper factors are applied to support an award.  Also, attorney fees may be 
awarded in paternity actions pursuant to NRS 126.171. 
